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Low coral islands are heavily dependent on 
groundwater for freshwater supplies. The 
availability, quality, and management of 
groundwater are central to sustainable 
development and poverty alleviation in many 
developing small island nations. The declaration 
by the Government of Kiribati of water reserves 
on the atoll of Tarawa, over privately owned land, 
has lead to conflicts, illegal settlements and 
vandalism of public assets. Beside, the water 
consumption per capita tends to increase towards 
western-like standards, threatening the 
sustainability of the actual exploitation system. 
Finally, pollution generated by the 45 000 
habitants of South Tarawa has already 
contaminated all the freshwater lenses, with the 
exception of the existing reserves so far. 
 
Our project, called AtollGame, aims at providing 
the relevant information to the local actors, 
including institutional and local community 
representatives in order to facilitate the dialogue 
and devise together sustainable and equitable 
water management practices.  Multi-Agent Based 
Simulations (MABS) coupled with a Role-Playing 
Game have been implemented to fulfil this aim. 
They have the potential to greatly reduce conflict 
over natural resource management and resource 
allocation. In order to collect, understand and 
merge viewpoints coming from different 
stakeholders, the following 3-stage methodology 
is applied: collecting local and expert knowledge, 
blending the different viewpoints into a game-
based model, playing the game with the different 
stakeholders in order to explore different scenarii 
and their simulated outcomes. 
 
Although game sessions delivered successful 
outcomes, the final stage of the project is 
characterised by the upheaval of contradictory 
Government stands that undermine the whole 
process. It is argued that heterogeneous 
viewpoints may be handled in a satisfactory 
manner during the gaming sessions, but that long-
term hidden agendas may override the outcomes. 
Beyond the inherent question of legitimacy 
attached to such approaches, it is clear, from our 
experience, that some players – especially those 
representing Government or supra-national 
institutions – have to deal with constraints that are 
often genuinely first considered as external to the 





Low coral islands are heavily dependent on 
groundwater for freshwater supplies. The 
availability, quality, and management of 
groundwater are central to sustainable 
development and poverty alleviation in many 
developing small island nations. Increasing 
populations, growing per capita demand and 
restricted land areas limit water availability and 
generate conflicts (Falkland and Brunel 1993).  
 
This study is carried out in the Republic of 
Kiribati, on the low-lying atoll of Tarawa (see 
Fig.1). The water resources are predominantly 
located in freshwater lenses on the largest islands 
of the atoll. The water table is typically 0.8 to 
1.6m below ground surface. South Tarawa is the 
capital and main population centre of the 
Republic. Pollution generated by its 45 000 
habitants has already contaminated most of the 
freshwater lenses. Hence, the water supply for 
South Tarawa inhabitants is pumped from 
horizontal infiltration galleries in protection zones 
with restricted access called « water reserves », on 
Bonriki and Buota islands. The galleries, 
connected to a reticulation system provide fresh 
water via individual taps all along South Tarawa. 
The Public Utility Board (PUB) is the 
Government owned corporation in charge of the 



















Figure 1: Tarawa Atoll. Bonriki and Buota 
islands are on the lower right of the atoll 
 
The water reserves currently supply about 1300 
m3/day, equivalent to about 30L/capita/day of 
freshwater, representing 60% of the needs of 
South Tarawa’s communities. The water 
consumption per capita tends to increase towards 
western-like standards, threatening the 
sustainability of the actual exploitation system. 
With an estimated 50% losses, the reticulated 
system is unable to meet the demand. Water is 
therefore supplied for only a few hours per day as 
a de facto demand management tool. Only a 
limited number of households have adopted rain 
harvesting technologies. Unfortunately, roof 
installations are often poorly managed (Carpenter 
et. al., 2002). Traditional wells remain an 
essential source of freshwater although they are 
anything but reliable. They are excavated close to 
the dwellings, very often located next to the 
lagoon-side shore. Hence, during extended 
drought spells, freshwater lenses shrink and the 
wells become increasingly brackish. 
 
Landownership and traditional landuse rights are 
central issues in the establishment of water 
reserves. As a matter of fact, land provides 
groundwater, food, attendant fishing rights and 
cash income from coprah harvesting (Jones, 
1997). Traditional landownership includes 
underground resources, a fact poorly appreciated 
when water reforms were proposed. Thus, the 
creation of water reserves has lead to conflicts, 
illegal settlements and vandalism of public assets 
(White et al., 1999). Payment of adequate 
compensation and restricted landuse are 
continuing contentious issues. Wider communities 
regard designated water reserves as common pool 
resources that can be easily plundered.  
 
The Government of Kiribati has obtained in 1999 
a loan from the Asian Development Bank in order 
to finance the US $10.24 million SAPHE project 
(SAnitation, Public Health and Environment). 
This project aims at improving the exploitation, 
distribution and sanitation system on South 
Tarawa. It is driven by a Steering Committee 
involving the PUB, the Ministry of Works and 
Energy, the Ministry of Environment, the 
Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Health, and 
the Land Department. On the exploitation side, it 
was proposed to rehabilitate and extend the 
existing water reserves. Hence intensive 
groundwater investigations were conducted on the 
islands of Abatao and Tabiteuea (north of Bonriki 
and Buota) in order to delineate the freshwater 
lenses and to provide accurate estimates of the 
sustainable water yields. Although previous 
reports insisted on the necessity to take into 
account the social impact of the new water 
reserves - in order to avoid the problems 
encountered on Bonriki and Buota - not much 
attention was given to this issue. As a 
consequence, contrasted viewpoints arose within 
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the Steering Committee regarding the legitimacy 
of these water reserves when cost-efficiency, 
social impacts and long-term sustainability were 
to be compared with alternate solutions.  
 
Addressing a demand from the Ministry of Works 
and Energy seeking for new participatory 
approaches, our project aims at providing the 
relevant information to the local actors, including 
institutional and local community representatives 
in order to facilitate the dialogue and devise 
together sustainable and equitable water 
management practices. A Role-Playing Game 
coupled with an computer-based simulator is 
implemented in order to fulfil this aim. This 
coupled approach provides powerful means for 
studying interactions between societies and their 
environment (Bousquet et. al. 2002). It has 
demonstrated its capacity to promote discussion 
amongst stakeholders with contrasted and 
eventually conflicting viewpoints (D’Aquino et. 
al., 2003). The success of the approach is 
inherently correlated with the ability of the 
players to identify their own mental constructs 
with the game’s features. Thus, it appears 
essential to format the game according to 
stakeholders’ standpoints. However, Becu et. al. 
(2003) showed that using knowledge elicitation 
techniques to infer formal ontologies was 
anything but trivial.  
 
Dray et al. (2004, in press) describe the 
methodology developed to collect, understand and 
merge viewpoints coming from different 
stakeholders in order to build a shared 
representation of the system through a conceptual 
model using Unified Modeling Language (UML). 
Applying a semi-automatic process using 
qualitative analysis softwares, it is possible to 
create from individual and fragmented narratives, 
a collective and consensual UML-based 
representation of the system. The common 
representation is used to build the essential 
elements of the role-playing game while 
conflicting issues are incorporated into the 
flexible design of the playing sessions.  
 
2. Conception of the computer-assisted RPG 
 
2.1 Conceptual framework 
 
The RPG is designed as a medium of 
communication based on the existing conceptual 
model. It is meant for opening or developing the 
communication between stakeholders. In a well-
designed RPG, players are aware of the issues at 
stake but allow themselves to express their views 
and behave accordingly to their beliefs. Another 
fundamental characteristic is the ability of the 
RPG to generate collective scenarios that will 
explore new management avenues. In order to 
achieve these tasks, the RPG must represent 
simplified features and processes encountered in 
the reality. In particular, biophysical processes, 
social interactions and spatial descriptions should 
be understood and accepted by all players as 
plausible assumptions. The RPG must also secure, 
at every stage of the game, the neutrality of the 
selected rules and of the Game-Master decisions. 
This “fair game” is instrumental in helping 
players to build self-confidence and to advocate 
their viewpoints. The RPG should create 
opportunities for players to comment, modify and 
improve the rules. Indeed, the game is 
intentionally designed with a rudimentary set of 
rules that needs improvement. Thus, players come 
progressively from playing against each other to a 
situation where they appropriate the game 
collectively. 
 
Finally, when players have realized the collective 
benefit of the game, they tend to explore more 
complex situations and to implement many more 
rules. Most of the time, the increasing complexity 
tends to bring together the artificial game and the 
real environment. What is at stake with this 
approach is to give stakeholders the capacity to 
build their future together. Of course, 
manipulation, lobbying, struggle for power are 
inherently part of the process, but in an armless 
and controlled environment. 
 
2.2 Game boards and virtual landscape 
 
The set of the game is composed of two maps 
displayed on separated tables. Both maps 
represent a 80 acres virtual island, based on a 
regular spatial grid with hexagonal cells. 
Concurrently, a similar computer-based 
environment is created with VisualWorks©, using 
the CORMAS© platform (Bousquet et al., 1998). 
These environments include generic features 
without direct references to actual islands in order 
to avoid any threatening feeling among players.  
 
Island 1 (Fig. 2) corresponds to a scarcely 
populated island (50 families) where the 
government is already pumping freshwater. The 
water reserve is delineated with a red line and 
pumping galleries are explicitly represented. 
Island 2 (Fig. 2) corresponds to an overcrowded 
island (200 families), already polluted and 



























Figure 2: Island 1 (top) and Island 2 (bottom) 
 
2.3 Water balance and hydro-geological 
models 
 
Biophysical processes and landuse dynamics are 
encapsulated into the computer-based simulator. 
According to the field interviews, freshwater 
lenses were perceived as global and undivided 
resources on each island. Water infiltration into 
the soil was acknowledged by a majority of 
interviewees. Runoff was not a concern due to the 
very high permeability of the coral-sand soils. 
Water uptake by vegetation and 
evapotranspiration processes were far less 
perceived. Therefore, we opted for a simple 
reservoir-like water balance model for our 
computer-based simulator. The model, called 
WATBAL (Falkland, 1992), uses 10-day period 
values of rainfall and potential evapotranspiration 
(PET). The first reservoir intercepts the rainfall at 
the vegetation level ; the second reservoir 
corresponds to the unsaturated soil storage and the 
third reservoir corresponds to the freshwater lens. 
Recharge of the lens may occur only after plants 
have satisfied their water requirements. Pumping 
galleries, traditonal wells, and coconut trees are 
able to extract water directly from the lens. Using 
the Cellular Automata capacities of our simulator, 
the water balance is calculated for each cell 
allowing the spatial heterogeneity of the processes 
and their time dependence to be taken into 
account.  
 
The shape and the depth of the freshwater lens is 
calculated according to the model proposed by 
Volker et al. (1985). This model predicts the 
depth of the freshwater lens and the thickness of 
the transition zone from the recharge and uptake 
values, according to the maximum length of the 
lens (radius). Two strong assumptions limit the 
use of this simple 2D model: (1) the recharge is 
constant, and (2) the lens is in a steady-state 
condition. Hence, the model is often used for 
long-term predictions based on ten years averaged 
data. This 2D model was modified into a 3D-like 
simulator using the isotropic properties of the 
mesh (Perez et al., 2003). To do so, some cells 
were selected and designated as lens nucleus, 
surrounded by concentric circles of 
isopiezometric cells. The orthogonal distance 
between the lagoon and ocean shores, crossing a 
nucleus gives the value of the corresponding 
radius (L). The elongated lens is approximated by 
a succession of these elementary units. The global 
volume of the lens corresponds to overlapping 
bowls. 
 
For a given cell, the freshwater thickness is given 
by the attribute depth. The hydrogeological model 
calculates each individual depth after averaging 
inputs and outputs over the whole freshwater lens. 
This attribute is then used to specify the water 
quality by updating the cell’s attribute 
“wellWaterQuality” according to a simple rule: if 
the depth is lower than 1.6m, the water is 
considered salty, if the depth is higher than 3.1m 
the water is considered fresh, and in between the 
water is declared brackish. This salinity index is 




According to the field interviews, the connection 
between land tenure issues and water 
management was a paramount element in the 
negotiations with the government. Beside, the 
population increase - mainly through immigration 
- was perceived as a threat in terms of water 
consumption, global pollution and pressure on the 
land. Thus, it was decided to design the game 
around land and water allocation conflicting rules. 
Each player, at the beginning of the game, 
becomes a local landowner having to 
accommodate an increasing number of incoming 
settlers.  
 
Each game board welcomes 8 players in order to 
facilitate playful interactions. This even number 
of players does not respect the real population 
densities in North and South Tarawa. These 
differences were taken into account with the 
creation of Household entities unevenly 
distributed among the two islands. They are 
represented by red pawns on the game boards. 







simulator are divided into landowners or 
relatives.  
 
Field interviews also showed that financial issues 
linked with water management mainly dealt with 
land leases, equipment investment and, seldom, 
with water pricing. Thus, it was necessary to 
allocate different types of income to the players in 
order to activate these mechanisms. Players can 
either be public servant, seamen or unemployed 
and are given corresponding tokens at the 
beginning of each round. The relatives settling on 
their land can cost the players money or provide 
some additional income. At the beginning of the 
game, each player randomly draws a card that 
defines his/her personal profile in the game: land 
location, type of job, and family size.  
 
2.5 Players’ objective 
 
Players are given the task to provide enough 
water to their family at each round in order to 
minimize the number of angry or sick people in 
their house. People become angry if they didn’t 
have enough water to drink and sick if they drank 
unhealthy water (salty or polluted). Spatially 
distributed salination processes are calculated and 
displayed by the computer-based simulator. As far 
as pollution processes remain conflictual among 
stakeholders, it was decided to introduce them as 
an arbitrary Pollution event during the game.  
 
In order to provide drinking water to their 
families, players are given buckets at the 
beginning of the game that can store 20 L/day 
roughly equivalent to daily individual needs. On 
purpose, the initial number of buckets is lower 
then the players’ needs. Thus, they have to buy 
equipments (pump, rainwater tank or PUB tank) 
that will increase their storing capacity. Usually, 
the rainwater tanks and PUB tanks automatically 
refill at the end of each round unless insufficient 
rainfall occurs. Players can decide to farm 
vegetable gardens in order to increase their 
income providing they have enough money and 
sufficient water storing capacity for irrigation at 





The game consists in 2 sessions of four rounds, 
each equivalent to a 3-month season. Initially, on 
Island 1, the pumping rate from the government is 
steady and corresponds to a 150 m3/day. On 
Island 2, the government is providing the local 
residents 150 m3/day through the pipe. As a 
matter of fact, in order to secure the consistency 
of the hydrogeological model, the computer-based 
simulator ran on a 10-day time step basis. 
Therefore, one round in the game accounts for 9 
time steps in the model. 
 
2.7 Playing rounds 
 
During the first session, dedicated to individual 
strategies, players have to accommodate new 
relatives on their land and adjust their income 
correspondingly. According to their available 
cash, they may choose to invest on new water 
equipments and/or decide to crop. The raining 
conditions influence groundwater salinity, storage 
in rainwater tanks and crop yields. This session 
allows players to perceive the impact of the 
location on their well’s water quality: the closer to 
the lagoon or ocean side, the saltier groundwater 
becomes during drought periods. At the end of the 
first session, one player on Island 1 is given the 
opportunity to sell part of his land to a new 
(virtual) settler, he can accept or not. At the same 
time, on Island 2, one player is given the 
opportunity to leave his land and to relocate on 
Island 1 if he can make a deal with another player 
on that island. This is meant to introduce the first 
interaction between the two tables.  
 
The second session is dedicated to collective 
decision-making. On Island 1, the game master 
mentions the fact that the government has decided 
to get rid of all the settlers and crops located on 
the reserve. Players have to relocate their relatives 
and they loose the removed crops. On Island 2, 
the government has decided to raise a connection 
fee from each dwelling connected to the pipe. One 
player, selected randomly, is given the task to 
fulfil the government decisions and becomes a 
“Water Agency” player. As such, he freely 
negotiates with players on both islands.  
 
3. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 




In April 2004, the 2-day workshop held in Tarawa 
gathered 16 representatives: 1 from the Public 
Utility Board, 1 from the Ministry of 
Environment, 1 from the SAPHE project, 1 from 
the Land Department and 3 from each of the 
concerned islands (Bonriki, Buota, Abatao and 
Tabiteuea). For the representatives of the 
aforementioned islands, the selection was entirely 
handled by the local communities, taking into 
account only two requests from our project team: 
(i) selecting outspoken individuals and (ii) 
expressing contrasted viewpoints within the 
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community. A formal invitation was sent to 
members of the SAPHE Steering Committee. 
They were given the choice to come themselves 
or to delegate the task to another representative of 
their Ministry. Only one out of four (i.e. the 
SAPHE Project manager) came, all others chose 
to delegate.  
 
3.2 Outcomes  
 
At first, it was encouraging to see that 
representatives from the different islands 
displayed different viewpoints about the Water 
Reserves. On the institutional side, the position of 
the different officers attending the workshop 
demonstrated a clear commitment to the project. 
All the participants showed the same level of 
motivation either to express their views on the 
issue or to genuinely try to listen to other 
viewpoints. Participants also accepted to follow 
the rules proposed by the Game Master, 
especially the necessity to look at the problem 
from a broader perspective. 
 
During the first session, the players quickly 
handled the game and entered into interpersonal 
discussions and comparisons. Most players 
experienced the fact that individual strategies 
were strongly dependent on environmental 
uncertainties. Interaction between the two tables 
started when one player from the Island 2 was 
given the opportunity to move to Island 1. The 
bargaining process that emerged from this new 
situation illustrated the actual tensions existing, in 
the reality, around the land tenure market. The 
connection between water management and land 
allocation issues was clearly demonstrated by the 
players’ behaviour. 
 
The second day, the introduction of a Water 
Agency and the selection of its Director created a 
little tension among the participants. But, after a 
while, the players accepted the new situation as a 
gaming scenario and started to interact with the 
newly created institution. On Island 1, the 
decision to remove crops and settlers from the 
Water Reserve immediately generated vivid 
discussions among players. On Island 2, the 
recovery of service fees from the players 
connected to the distribution pipe had the same 
effect. At that stage, players started to merge 
arguments based on the game with other ones 
coming directly from the reality. On Island 1, 
players entered direct negotiations with the 
Director of the Water Agency. On Island 2, 
discussions opposed players willing or not to pay 
the fee. 
 
Finally, the Game Master introduced the fact that 
the Water Agency was no longer able to maintain 
the reticulated system due to a poor recovery of 
the service fees. It had for immediate 
consequence a sharp decrease of the water 
quantity offered on Island 2. At this stage, all 
players gathered around Island 1 and entered a 
collective debate on the water reserve 
management. Consequently, players were asked 
to go back to their table and to list solutions to 
improve the situation on their island. When the 
two lists were completed, the Game Master 
helped the participants to build a flowchart of 
financial, technical and social solutions (Fig.3), 
taking into account issues from both islands. 
 
3.3 Exploring scenarios 
 
A collective analysis of the flowchart concluded 
that the actual situation was largely unsustainable 
either from a financial or social viewpoint: The 
Government relies on the Land Leases (top part of 
the flowchart) in order to secure social acceptance 
of the Water Reserves. The land market already 
pushes land prices to levels that can’t be matched 
by Government Leases. Beside, other technical 
solutions (Desalination plants, improved 
distribution) are not yet directly linked with the 














Figure 3: Flowchart of financial, technical and 
social solutions 
 
The flowchart above provides a set of inter-
dependent solutions that should be explored in 
order to gradually unlock the present situation. 
Whether we look at already existing or forecasted 
Water Reserves, the following guidelines are 
highly relevant. The financial solutions could be 
mitigated with technical solutions including 
regulated access to the Water Reserves or 
Participatory Management of the pumping. The 
water exploitation issues could be more strongly 
linked with the water distribution ones, and 
eventually with the sanitation ones (keeping in 
mind that the later are generally disconnected 
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from the others by most people). Exploring the 
middle part of the flowchart would enable more 
‘consensual’ stakeholders to participate in 
negotiations that are presently dominated by more 
extremist views. Management issues on the 
existing Water Reserves (Bonriki and Buota) and 
implementation issues on the forecasted ones 
(Abatao and Tabiteuea) are inherently 
interrelated. On one side, creating new Water 
Reserves without confronting the actual problems 
on the existing ones is not viable. On the other 
side, the introduction of new actors in the debate 
helps reducing the actual bipolar confrontation 
between landowners and the Government on the 
existing Water Reserves. 
 
4. Discussion and Perspectives 
 
4.1 Instant debriefing  
 
At the end of the 2-day workshop, the project 
team held what we called an “instant debriefing”. 
Beyond our satisfaction of having conducted a 
playful and fruitful exercise, our analysis focused 
on the ways to transform the scenario-flowchart 
into a viable road map for the Government. 
Careful study of the memos (videos, notes, and 
game spreadsheets) revealed the existence of two 
types of strategic behaviour among players that 
would strongly influence the outcomes: 
 
Final discussions around the flowchart were 
highjacked by a minority of pseudo-players. 
These were local stakeholders who came with a 
strong agenda in mind and tried to enforce their 
views throughout the game. As requested, they 
were indeed outspoken representatives but not 
prepared to compromise. The RPG failed 
modifying their position and, for example, they 
locked the discussions into endless arguing about 
financial compensations. However, the game 
helped more consensual players to take some 
distance from these extremist views and to 
advocate a more flexible approach of the future 
negotiations.  
 
On the contrary, some representatives of 
Government agencies appeared to be virtual-
players, without any mandate for decision back to 
their home institution. As previously mentioned, 
only one player was part of the SAPHE Steering 
Committee, all others were not directly involved 
in the decision-making process regarding the 
water reserves issues. These players played a fair 
game but hardly attempted to defend their 
Agency’s policy. Hence, the RPG was only 
perceived as a mere exercise of communication.  
 
Hence, it was highly recommended that the next 
steps involve a sequential process for interactions. 
First, experts from the relevant Government 
Agencies should be confronted with a new 
version of the computer-based simulator, 
including most of the options present in the 
existing flowchart. The experts would help 
selecting affordable scenarios for the government 
and tuning the parameters. Then, these scenarios 
should be presented in the different villages 
through collective meetings where people would 
have the opportunity to interact with the computer 
simulations. Evaluation of the Government 
criteria and scenarios would lead to the creation 
of newly modified ones. At last, the Government 
experts and the island’s representatives should 
meet again to assess the remaining options and 
hopefully agree on an equitable management 
scenario. 
 
4.2 Distant debriefing 
 
End of May 2004, the project team came back to 
Tarawa in order to implement the aforementioned 
strategy. Unfortunately, soon after arrival, we 
were informed that the SAPHE-Steering 
Committee had decided to organize meetings with 
the local communities on Tabiteuea and Abatao. 
The official objective of these meetings was to 
present the design of the pumping galleries to the 
local residents and to seek for their agreement in 
principle. During separate meetings with 
members of the Steering Committee, the project 
team tried to underline the inherent risk linked to 
this hasty decision: 
 
The SAPHE-Steering Committee relied on a 
design extracted from a technical report 
(Falkland, 2003) that was not meant to be a final 
blue-print for implementation. The report 
carefully investigated the hydro-geological 
conditions prevailing on Abatao and Tabiteuea 
and provided some guidance in terms of 
positioning (distance to actual settlements). There 
was no mention of landownership issues, 
demographic growth or pollution control. 
 
The SAPHE-Steering Committee was not yet able 
to provide complete information to the local 
communities about financial arrangements, land 
use constraints or other compensation claims 
eventually raised by some local residents. 
Beyond, the local negotiation issue, these 
elements are instrumental in evaluating the 
economic viability of such a technological option. 
Falkland (2003) was very cautious regarding this 
specific aspect in his recommendations. The 
SAPHE-Steering Committee didn’t take into 
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account the outcomes of the Role Playing Game 
Workshop that provided a tentative “road map” 
for further negotiations, including financial and 
technical aspects. It was obvious that an upfront 
confrontation would re-ignite the “water lease” 
issue. Beside, the present state of mind of a 
majority of residents on Abatao needed to be dealt 
cautiously with in order to avoid any more 
damages. Despite the concerns above, the SAPHE 
meetings were confirmed but the Steering 
Committee accepted our project team to attend the 
meetings as observers. As expected, the meetings 
held in Tabiteuea and Abatao would have 
benefited from a careful analysis and better 
understanding of the outcomes of the Role 
Playing Game workshop. Whether they agreed or 
not with the water reserve, local residents 
constantly referred to our final flowchart. These 
meetings resulted in a back-stepping and sterile 
process where a majority of local residents 
focused again on the financial aspects of the 
question. 
 
The reason of this seemingly backlash from the 
Steering Committee is partly to be found in the 
absence of crucial meta-players during the RPG 
sessions. The Asian Development Bank (ADB), 
the Project Contractor, and the Government 
Cabinet control the financial, technical, and 
political agendas of the SAPHE project. One year 
to the end of the loan-based project, technical 
delivery from the contractor became essential in 
order to secure the last payments and to turn on 
the loan reimbursement countdown. At the 
political level, the Cabinet was entangled in 
multiple discussions with the ADB and other 
funding agencies. As a matter of fact, the Steering 
Committee, instead of being a driving force, had 
become an arena for external and conflicting 
pressures.  
 
Despite our genuine claim (i) that the results from 
the RPG were far from being detrimental to the 
SAPHE project, and (ii) that further negotiations 
with local communities would need far less than 6 
months, the financial and technical agendas 
prevailed. Beyond the timing issue, it is also 
assumed that acknowledging the results of our 
own project would have been considered by some 
members of the Steering Committee as a 
recognition of incapacity to tackle the problem in 
the first place. The incapacity of the political level 
to handle the uncertainty of the situation was 
demonstrated by a first decision to freeze the 
SAPHE project (October 2004), and then to 
accept its implementation (January 2005) without 
modification. The frustrating consequences were 
that more than 6 months were lost in the process 
and that the local communities ended up as 
frustrated as usual. An interesting final twist is the 
actual willingness of PUB to resume collaboration 
with our research team in order to develop a more 
participatory approach in the future. This struggle 
between centralized and decentralized 
management is epitomized in the concept of 
polycentric institutions developed by Ostrom in 
her most recent work (2004). Technical agencies - 
like PUB – very often rely on deductive scientific 
approaches to reach outcomes that would need 
more inductive and flexible solutions. But 
flexibility means that one must assume some 
uncertainty during the implementation and give 
up hope on deterministic and predictable solutions 
(Bradshaw and Borchers, 2000). What is true at 
the technical level becomes paramount at the 
political one. 
 
Hence, there is a need for integrating not only the 
participation, but more importantly the 
engagement of local communities in projects that 
concern their future. Following Aslin and Brown 
(2004), we argue that local communities need to 
be involved not only in the analysis of the results 
(consultation) or the choice of the possible 
scenarios (participation), but in the knowledge 
creation itself (engagement). This is the post-
normal way chosen, for example, by colleagues 
working on Companion Modelling approaches 
(Bousquet et al., 2002). 
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